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Abstract  
Purpose –This paper examines the inter-organisational processes used to control 
international master franchise agreements from operational, relational and evolutionary 
perspectives.   
 
Design/methodology/approach – The research is undertaken through a qualitative, in depth 
case study in the international hotel industry.  The case comprises an international master 
franchise agreement between a large US-based hotel franchisor and its European master 
franchisee. 
 
Findings – The study identifies the inter-related nature of operational and relational control 
processes and how these evolve over the life of a master franchise agreement.  It reveals how 
the perceptions of franchise members serve to enhance or inhibit the development of 
relational norms and how these, in turn, impact on the predominant type of control and the 
specific inter-organisational processes employed.   
 
Research Limitations – The research is based on a single in-depth case study within one 
industrial context and the universality of the findings may therefore be limited. 
 
Practical Implications – The paper offers insights to managers of international master 
franchise agreements on the interaction between members’ perceptions, relational norms 
developed and the inter-organisational processes used to control the agreement.  It also 
reveals how the use of contractual controls can inhibit the development of relational norms 
and negatively impact on relationships between franchisors and master franchisees. The 
findings presented may have relevance to managers of other types of international alliance 
agreements. 
 
Originality/value –By drawing on both the alliance and franchise literature and employing a 
qualitative approach, the study helps to close a gap in the current international franchise 
literature through the identification of specific inter-organisational processes for control 
within international master franchise agreements, how these evolve in respect of relational 
norms and how these are underpinned by perceptions of franchisor and franchisee members.   
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Introduction 
 
Within retail and service industries, international expansion through franchising has become 
increasingly popular (Altinay and Wang, 2006; Doherty and Alexander, 2004).  In any 
franchise system, the importance of maintaining a tightly controlled and integrated system 
that supports a defined brand name and image is well-recognised (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996; 
Quinn, 1999).  However, whilst empirical studies on domestic franchising are abundant, 
international franchise systems have received less attention (Sashi and Karuppur, 2002).  
Research has tended to focus on the rationale for internationalising, the internationalisation 
process, or the factors that influence the choice of franchising as an international market entry 
strategy (see Quinn and Alexander, 2002 or Doherty, 2007a; 2007b for a detailed review).  
Modal choice studies have subsequently given rise to investigations of operational control 
and support within international franchise systems (Quinn, 1999; Quinn and Doherty, 2000; 
Doherty and Alexander, 2006).  While this latter stream highlights the importance of inter-
organisational processes for control, the research area is still relatively underdeveloped 
(Doherty, 2007a). Other researchers have identified the relevance of franchisor and 
franchisee relationships to the control of franchise systems (Perry et al, 2002; Doherty and 
Alexander, 2004; Monroy and Alzola, 2005; Clarkin and Swavely, 2006; Weaven and Frazer, 
2007a).  Nevertheless, there have been few attempts to consider control concurrently from 
both operational and relational perspectives. 
 
The link between control and inter-firm relationships has received more attention within the 
alliance literature.  While the importance of clear inter-organisational processes to maintain 
control is well documented, researchers have also recognised the significance of social 
controls to manage relational behaviour between alliance partners (Larsen, 1992; Spekman et 
al, 1998; Kauser and Shaw, 2004).  Furthermore, empirical studies have highlighted the 
evolutionary nature of relationships in alliance agreements (Kanter, 1994; Buono, 1997; 
Batonda and Perry, 2003; Poulymenakou and Prasopoulou, 2004) and the potential impact 
this might have on the control systems used (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Das and Teng, 
1998; Gulati, 1998; Dekker, 2004).  This research suggests that operational and relational 
control systems may change over time, yet there is a scarcity of empirical research that 
examines control simultaneously from operational, relational and evolutionary viewpoints. 
 
Researchers have also identified fluidity in franchisor and franchisee relationships over time 
(Connell, 1999). However, within the international franchise literature, it is not currently 
clear whether control systems evolve over the life of franchise agreements or how operational 
and relational controls impact on each other during this process. This paper reports the 
findings from an empirical study that addresses this knowledge gap through an investigation 
of control in international franchise systems from operational, relational and evolutionary 
perspectives. The research context is international master franchise agreements; a particular 
type of business format franchising that entitles the franchisee the rights to open franchised 
units and to grant these rights to third parties as sub-franchisors, usually over a defined 
geographical territory (Connell, 1999; Quinn and Alexander, 2002). As such, they are 
contractual agreements that are distinct in their own right, yet bear resemblance to other types 
of inter-organisational alliances. Given this characteristic, the study examines control from 
both franchisor and franchisee perspectives, drawing on the alliance literature where dyadic 
inter-firm perspectives have been incorporated.  While business relationships have also been 
examined within the marketing literature, much of the research has been conducted from a 
single organisation perspective (Athanasopoulou, 2009).  
 
The paper aims to make a two-fold contribution to the international franchise literature: 
firstly, investigating operational, relational and evolutionary control in international franchise 
systems and secondly, by increasing our knowledge and understanding of the use of master 
franchises as specific franchise system phenomena.  It begins with a review of the two 
literature streams- control in alliance and control in franchise systems- and then draws these 
two streams together, identifying the specificities of master franchise systems.  The research 
design and findings from a case study are then presented. The conclusion highlights the 
contributions of the study and offers recommendations for further research and implications 
for practitioners. 
 
Control in alliance agreements 
 
Although there are a variety of different types of alliance agreements, they are generally 
considered to be mutually beneficial contractual agreements with a defined purpose and 
shared resources between two or more firms (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Arino, et al 2001; 
Parise and Casher, 2003; Todeva and Knoke, 2005).  The design of effective inter-firm 
processes to control and coordinate the activities of alliance partners is important (Arino and 
de la Torre, 1998) as the contract does not provide sufficient control for every future 
eventuality (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Ivens, 2005).  Geringer and Herbert (1989:237) 
suggest that in inter-organisational agreements control is, 
 
‘the process by which one partner influences, to varying degrees, the 
behaviour and output of the other partner, through the use of power, authority 
and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal mechanisms.’       
The authors also identify three dimensions of inter-organisational control: focus, extent and 
mechanisms.  Respectively, these refer to the scope of activities monitored, the degree to 
which control is exercised and the means by which it is achieved.  Kauser and Shaw (2004) 
argue that any investigation of inter-firm control needs to consider all three dimensions.   
Geringer and Herbert’s (1989) definition also reflects the role of behavioural, outcome and 
social controls in alliance management.  Other researchers add that these types of control are 
important both before and after contractual agreements are signed (Das and Teng, 1998; 
Gulati and Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2004).  Behavourial control refers to the actions by and 
between individuals and partner organisations and their impact on alliance results, whereas 
output control concerns assessment against these results (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991).  
Mechanisms to achieve behavioural control include direct supervision, training, job 
descriptions, standard operating procedures, formalised policies and the processes used to 
ensure adherence to these (Cardinal et al, 2004; Das, 2005).  Outcome control mechanisms 
include the decision-making processes and tools employed to set budgets, allocate resources 
and determine quality, and the reporting procedures to monitor performance against targets 
set (Chang and Taylor, 1999; Cardinal et al, 2004).  In contrast, social controls are designed 
to engender interpersonal relationships within and across alliance partners (Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1994; Arino and de la Torre, 1998). Social control processes include those that 
influence partner selection and the setting of joint goals to identify potentially long-lasting 
relationships as well as those used for shared decision making after contracts are signed (Das 
and Teng, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2004). 
There is some consensus within the literature on the importance of behavioural control to 
achieve alliance goals (Das and Teng, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2004; Kauser 
and Shaw, 2004).  However, Larsen (1992) argues that social controls are the most important 
to manage the relational behaviour of alliance members.  While Spekman et al (1998) suggest 
it would be naïve to rely solely on these, there is a good deal of support for the use of social 
control processes.  Buono (1997) notes that they can add to the development of shared ways 
of operating to better coordinate the activities of different firms. Social processes are also 
reported to break down organisational boundaries, increase the permeability between 
organisations (Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Dess et al, 1995) and thus improve inter-
organisational coordination. 
Coordination considerations are extensive in inter-firm arrangements (Gulati and Singh, 
1998) and need to be carefully considered for any inter-firm learning to take place (Mohr and 
Sengupta; 2002). Typical mechanisms include communication and information-sharing 
routines, rules and procedures, liaison and integration roles, cross-functional teams and task 
forces (Grandori, 1997; Gittel and Weiss, 2004; Tuomela and Salonen, 2005).  These 
coordination mechanisms are reported to be more difficult to manage and potentially more 
costly without the benefit of some formal and hierarchic control procedures (Gulati and 
Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2004).  However, Gulati and Singh (1998) conclude from their research 
on buyer-supplier relationships that firms will balance the cost of coordination against the 
risk of partner firms behaving opportunistically.  Furthermore, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) 
warn that control processes that incorporate excessive legal structuring and hierarchical 
monitoring of the relationship can be detrimental. 
Other researchers suggest that the need for formalised and hierarchic control processes 
diminishes over time (Foss, et al, 2000; Arino et. al 2001; Dekker, 2004) as the development 
of trust between firms drives a change to the use of more informal self-enforcing safeguards 
(Dyer, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Trust relates to both 
capability to perform required tasks and to goodwill, the expectation that a firm will act in the 
best interest of the agreement and not behave opportunistically (Cullen et al, 2000; Dekker, 
2004).  Within the literature there is a continued debate as to whether trust acts as a substitute 
or complement for formal control as it emerges (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Das and Teng, 
1998; Gulati, 1998; Dekker, 2004) and the need for further research is recognised (Arnott, 
2007).  Arino et al (2001: p111) suggest therefore that relational quality or ‘the extent to 
which the partners feel comfortable and are willing to rely on trust in dealing with one 
another’ is a more relevant construct.  Relational quality reflects the sense of unity and 
balance of power in the alliance. As such, it incorporates other alliance characteristics such as 
degree of compatibility of corporate cultures, decision-making styles and communication.  As 
alliances evolve (Kanter, 1994; Buono, 1997; Batonda and Perry, 2003; Poulymenakou and 
Prasopoulou, 2004),  the relational experiences between members are reported to drive the 
development of shared norms of behaviour (Ahuja, 2000; Ivens, 2005) that serve to control 
the agreement more informally, yet still inhibit opportunistic behaviour.    
Research on alliances suggests therefore, that a combination of behavioural, outcome and 
social controls is important in the management of alliance agreements.  These controls 
comprise formal procedures and mechanisms for decision making to define and monitor 
financial and quality targets and the inter-organisational processes for communication to 
share information and coordinate the activities of the different firms.  Furthermore, the 
literature suggests that the combination of these processes may change over the operating life 
of the agreement.  However, empirical findings are mixed, particularly in relation to the 
impact of the different control processes and mechanisms on each other as alliances evolve.   
 
Control in franchise agreements   
 
As with alliance agreements, control is a fundamental issue within any type of franchise 
system.  Agency theorists have long argued that there are often divergent interests between 
principals (franchisors) and agents (franchisees) and that franchisees may behave 
opportunistically to pursue their own interests at the expense of those of the franchisor 
(Brickley and Dark, 1987; Lafontaine, 1992; Elango and Fried, 1997; Dant and Nasr, 1998; 
Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Quinn and Doherty, 2000).  Maintaining a tightly controlled 
and integrated system that supports a defined brand name and image is deemed essential to 
gain competitive advantage in any type of franchise system (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996).  
However, system-wide growth in international markets is frequently at odds with maintaining 
a consistent brand image and uniform product and service standards (Wang and Altinay, 
2008). Franchisors are faced with the challenge of maintaining uniformity across the 
franchise system to protect the brand, while at the same time facilitating local responsiveness 
to meet the demands of different markets (Bradach, 1997; Weaven and Frazer, 2007a).  
Hoffman and Preble (1991) identify three different types of control in franchise systems; 
legal, economic and administrative. The extent to which the contract is the main source of 
control in franchising has been the subject of a number of investigations (Felstead, 1993; 
Stanworth, 1991; Stern and El-Ansary, 1992; Fulop and Forward, 1997).  As with alliances, 
there are limitations to its effectiveness in franchising. Some studies suggest that contractual 
controls are only used when there are serious breaches of agreement (Connell, 1997; Quinn, 
1997) or when the franchisor wishes to establish structural system changes (Connell, 1997). 
The franchisor’s willingness to use the contract as a source of power also impacts upon the 
effectiveness of this control mechanism (Quinn and Doherty, 2000). Furthermore, in 
international franchising, contracts cannot be standardised and are more difficult to enforce 
due to the geographic distances involved (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996, 2000). Nonetheless, 
franchisees’ fear of losing their investment and their willingness to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour is based upon the threat of potential expulsion from the system and the associated 
economic risks (Hopkinson and Hogarth-Scott, 1999) and thus on the franchisor’s willingness 
and ability to enforce the contract.  However, in master franchise agreements, the few 
empirical studies conducted suggest that economic control may be higher. For example, it is 
suggested that by raising reward expectations, economic control is increased as self-enforcing 
mechanisms that reduce opportunistic behaviour are created (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996; 
Bradach, 1998; Bercovitz, 2002; Skalins and Mayer, 2002).   
Administrative controls comprise the operational processes used to achieve goal alignment 
and monitor adherence to these (Hoffman and Preble, 1991).  These control mechanisms 
include decision-making processes and the mechanisms used to monitor financial and quality 
targets and are similar to output and behavioural controls identified in the alliance literature.  
Training and brand manuals are frequently used to support franchisees, maintain quality 
control (Doherty, 2007a) and control brand uniformity (Quinn and Doherty, 2000).  Inter-
organisational processes for communication and information sharing are also important to the 
control of international franchise systems (Dant and Nasr, 1998; Quinn, 1998).   However, 
the effectiveness of administrative control is related to the geographical distances involved 
and the different environments of the host countries (Hoffman and Preble, 1991; Fladmoe-
Lindquist, 1996; Elango and Fried, 1997; Quinn, 1998) and is therefore potentially more 
limited in international franchising.  There are further limitations identified in master 
franchise agreements where responsibility for quality control may be devolved to master 
franchisees who are also reported to filter franchisor communication (Ryans et al, 1999).  The 
evidence from research is mixed however, with some studies suggesting master franchisees 
are more likely to behave opportunistically given their unique status (Weaven and Frazer, 
2007b); and others suggesting they are more likely to conform to franchisor practice than 
franchisees operating single units (Dant and Nasr, 1998; Doherty and Alexander, 2006).  
However, Quinn (1999) argues that many studies have addressed the issue of control 
superficially and Quinn and Doherty (2000) report the need for further research to determine 
the mechanisms used to control international franchise systems, master or otherwise.  
 
The control challenges faced by international franchisors have led researchers to consider the 
importance of franchisor-franchisee relationships, similar to alliance researchers.  Hopkinson 
and Hogarth-Scott (1999) argue that control in franchise systems can be developed through 
effective relationship management. Managing franchisor - franchisee relationships has also 
been linked directly to the success of franchise systems (Weaven and Frazer, 2007a) although 
the factors that influence cooperation in franchise relationships are not well understood 
(Clarkin and Swavely, 2006).  However, Connell (1997) concludes from his study of 
international master franchising in the hotel industry, that franchisor and master franchisee 
relationships have an ongoing fluidity and that support structures and communication 
channels are important to these relationships.  Monroy and Alzola (2005) also recognise the 
evolutionary nature of master franchise agreements and argue conceptually that the quality of 
relationships in franchise systems develops over time as trust, mutual commitment and 
relational norms develop.  The authors advise that these norms, in turn, reflect the flexibility 
of franchise members, the perceived mutuality of the agreement, the sense of unity amongst 
franchise members and the spirit of cooperation.  While this argument suggests that relational 
controls become more important over the life of a master franchise agreement, there is a need 
for empirical evidence to support it.   
 
 
Control in alliance and franchise agreements 
 
The review of these two streams of literature highlights a number of similarities in the 
research findings on control in alliance and franchise agreements, despite the different 
terminology employed.  The limitations of contractual or legal controls are recognised in both 
literatures, albeit for different reasons.  In addition, within both types of agreements, 
operational and relational control processes are reported to be used in combination to achieve 
behavioural, outcome and social control.  The literature also suggests a good deal of 
similarity in the control mechanisms and processes used within both types of agreements, 
despite the differences in how these are labeled.  Key control mechanisms in alliance and 
franchise agreements include inter- organisational processes used to maintain financial and 
quality control, and inter-organisational processes for decision making, coordination and 
communication.   The relevance of formalised documentation such as brand or training 
manuals and standard operating procedures is also identified.   Table 1 draws together the two 
streams of literature to summarise the inter-organisational processes used to maintain 
operational and relational control and the effectiveness of these as reported in the literature.  
 
 Table 1 provides evidence of the maturity of research on control within the alliance literature 
compared to that within franchising, and suggests that a greater understanding of the latter 
could be gained by drawing on this literature. The shaded areas highlight clear gaps in our 
understanding of control in international franchising and master franchise agreements that 
could be better understood through this approach.  In particular, Table 1 identifies that there 
is a need for further research to identify the factors that influence cooperation in international 
franchising; the impact of relational controls on operational controls in international and 
master franchising; and the use and effectiveness of relational controls in master franchise 
agreements.  In an effort to address these knowledge and empirical gaps, this study 
investigates control in international master franchise agreements from operational, relational 
and evolutionary perspectives through an investigation of the inter-organisational processes 
identified in Table 1.  In so doing it also extends our understanding of master franchise 
systems and of international franchising. The design of the study is explained in the following 
section. 
  
Research design  
 
Research context and case 
The research was conducted within the context of the international hotel industry, where 
master franchise agreements have a long history and continue to be a popular expansion 
strategy (Strauss, 2007).  In addition, this industrial context serves to build on a growing 
number of empirical studies undertaken within international retailing where academic interest 
in international franchising is similarly in its infancy (Doherty and Alexander, 2006).  
Alexander and Lockwood (1996) suggest that there are strong similarities between these two 
industry sectors and much potential for learning by combining research experiences. The case 
is an international master franchise agreement for one hotel brand that has been in operation 
for over 10 years.  The length of the agreement is important in exploring how inter-
organisational processes and relationships evolve over time.   
 
The case comprises a US franchisor, part of a multi-divisional conglomerate, which owns the 
hotel brand, and a European master franchisee of that brand, also part of a multi-divisional 
conglomerate.  At the start of the agreement, the franchisor had approximately 270 hotels 
with over 60,000 rooms in its predominantly North American brand portfolio.  The master 
franchisee operated 29 hotels with around 11,000 rooms in 11 European countries.  At the 
time of the research however, the franchisor’s brand portfolio had grown to 450, mostly 3-
star hotels with almost 100,000 rooms in 60 countries.  Part of this growth was achieved 
through the master franchisee whose portfolio had grown during the course of the agreement 
to 110, mostly 4-star hotels, with 29,000 rooms in 38 countries.   
 
Research strategy and data collection methods 
In order to fully explore control within international master franchise agreements a qualitative 
case study was employed.  Qualitative studies are increasingly used within international 
franchise research so that a better understanding of operational issues can be determined 
(Doherty, 2007a; Weaven and Frazer, 2007a), particularly in studies of retail franchising 
(Doherty, 2009). The single case study approach was deemed appropriate given that the 
authors were given exceptional access to those executives involved on both sides of the 
partnership since it was established and over the extended period of time as it developed. As 
a leading and long-established brand, the single case enabled ‘certain insights’ which ‘other 
organizations would not be able to provide’ (Siggelkow, 2007: 20).  Similarly, Altinay (2004) 
and Alexander (2009) demonstrate the value of in-depth single case study strategies in 
franchise and retail research.    
 
Table 1: Control in Alliance and Franchise Agreements 
Type of 
Control: 
Terms Used 
Mechanisms Used  in Alliance 
and Franchise Agreements 
Effectiveness of control 
  Alliance Agreements International Franchise 
Agreements 
International Master 
Franchise Agreements 
Operational 
 
Alliance: 
Behavioural 
Outcome 
 
 
Franchise: 
Administrative 
Economic 
 Training, brand manuals, job 
descriptions, standard 
operating procedures, formal 
policies  
 Inter-organisational processes 
used to ensure adherence to 
standards set 
 Inter-organisational processes 
for decision making and 
information sharing used to set 
budgets, allocate resources, 
determine quality, monitor 
performance against financial 
and quality targets set 
 Behavioural controls 
considered more important 
than outcome control; 
relevant pre and post 
contract 
 Some hierarchical 
operational controls 
required  
 Operational controls may 
be replaced by or 
complimented with 
relational controls over 
time 
 
 Administrative controls 
reduced in international 
franchise agreements due 
to geographic distances 
and market differences;  
 Economic controls based 
on threat of expulsion 
from franchise system 
and franchisor 
willingness to use 
contract 
 Administrative controls 
may be reduced due to 
degree of quality control 
devolved to master 
franchisee and by  master 
franchisee filtering 
franchisor communication 
 Economic control 
potentially greater due to 
greater financial 
investment of master 
franchisee 
Relational 
 
Alliance: 
Social 
 
Franchise: 
Relational   
 Processes for partner selection 
(pre contract)  
 Inter-organisational processes 
for joint goal setting (pre and 
post contract) 
 Inter-organisational processes 
for coordination including 
communication and 
information sharing, liaison 
and integration roles, cross-
functional teams and task 
forces (post contract) 
 Shared norms of behaviour 
(post contract) 
 Social controls can help to 
coordinate the activities of 
different firms in alliances, 
break down organisational 
barriers and lead to 
development of shared 
norms 
 Social controls may replace 
operational controls over 
time; empirical findings 
mixed as to whether they 
complement or substitute 
operational controls 
 Factors that influence 
cooperation in franchise 
relationship not clearly  
understood 
 How relational controls 
impact on operational 
controls not currently 
identified 
 Operational controls 
underpin franchisor-
master franchisee 
relationships 
 Evolutionary nature of 
relationships identified 
but use and effectiveness 
of relational controls 
untested  
 How relational controls 
impact on operational 
controls not currently 
identified 
 
Primary data was collected using semi-structured key informant interviews; a practice 
frequently used in organisational studies as it provides an economical approach to gaining 
‘global’ data on organisations (Bryman, 1994:49).  The interview schedule was organised 
according to the inter-organisational processes and mechanisms used for quality and financial 
control, decision-making, coordination and communication as identified in Table 1. The 
interview focussed on how these different processes were designed when the franchise 
agreement was established, how these changed over time and the factors that influenced the 
decisions that were undertaken and the changes to inter-organisational processes that were 
implemented. 
 
Multiple interviews were conducted with corporate level franchisor and franchisee informants 
in North America and in Europe to provide cross-checking opportunities and increase the 
reliability of the findings.  Eight interviews in total were conducted over 20 hours with the 
Brand CEO and corporate members responsible for strategy, development, marketing and 
financial management in both the franchisor and franchisee organisations.  At least two 
respondents from each organisation had been involved in the original development of the 
master franchise agreement thereby providing longitudinal perspectives that are considered 
important in inter-organisational research (Buono, 1997).  For both franchisor and franchisee 
organisations, three interviews were held within a relatively short space of time and a further 
interview with an additional respondent was conducted at a later stage to allow the main 
researcher to look for gaps in the data and to identify issues that needed further clarification.  
 
Additional data was gathered in the form of archival analysis and document review (Yin, 
2003) that included: 
 organisation charts,  
 brand standards and operating procedures,  
 job descriptions,  
 annual and interim accounts and reports,  
 company newsletters and employee magazines,  
 press releases,  
 internal memos and  
 analyst and investor reports.  
 
The resulting triangulation of data helped ensure reliability of the overall findings.   
 
Data was analysed using NVivo according to the ‘three concurrent flows of activity’ (Miles 
and Huberman, 1999, p. 16): data reduction, data display and conclusions drawing.  Data 
reduction took place through both descriptive and interpretive coding (Gibbs, 2004).  
Descriptive coding was undertaken based on the inter-organisational processes investigated.  
Interpretive coding then took place according to the themes that emerged from the 
informants.  Data was displayed by individual firm and then across the dyadic relationship in 
order to facilitate comparison across the franchisor and franchisee firms involved. The extant 
literature was then used to draw conclusions from this study (Perry, 1998), the findings of 
which are presented in the following section. 
 
Control in international master franchise agreements 
 
The data reveals that inter-organisational mechanisms and processes used to control the 
master franchise change over the life of the agreement.  Three distinct stages of evolution 
were identified and drawing on informant responses, these stages have been labelled as 
formation, development and maturity.  The inter-organisational processes for quality and 
financial control, decision-making, coordination, and communication within each stage are 
displayed in Table 2.  The factors that underpin the decisions for the specific processes 
employed are discussed below. 
 
Stage one: formation 
This first stage began with the identification of the need for a partner firm and lasted 
throughout the negotiation process.  Each firm had a clearly defined purpose for seeking a 
partner that reflected their organisational growth strategies.  Whilst the franchisor was 
seeking further international expansion through one of its preferred entry modes, the master 
franchisee sought to grow by ‘access to new markets’ and senior managers decided they 
Table 2 The Evolution of Inter-Organisational Processes in Master Franchise Agreements 
Process Stage One: Formation Stage Two: Development Stage Three:  Maturity 
Control  Negotiated as devolved to 
master franchisee, 
including diagnostic 
systems for quality control  
 Formal financial controls 
such as development 
targets included and 
monitored centrally 
 Control  processes become hierarchical 
 Control dictated by power in the contract  
to franchisor  
 Emphasis on control through diagnostic 
systems including financial contribution to 
the system and quality indicators  
 Master franchisee also allowed to use 
diagnostic mechanisms to monitor output 
of  franchisor 
 Control processes became more devolved  
 Diagnostic systems used to evaluate quality control but 
monitored by  master franchisee or third party 
organisations 
 Financial control processes altered and more financial 
information was shared  
 Trust reported as essential for this to work  
 Control enhanced through the development of shared 
norms 
Decision 
Making 
 Negotiated  to include 
involvement of master 
franchisee through formal 
vehicles such as Global 
Brand Council 
 Decision making becomes more centralised  
 Master franchisee had very little input, 
even through formal vehicles due to way 
they are managed 
 Tensions between franchisor and master 
franchisee reported 
 Input once more by master franchisee 
 Some formal vehicles disbanded and replaced by more 
informal mechanisms and processes 
 Master franchisee has freedom to adapt initiatives to suit 
local market conditions  
 
 
Coordination  Negotiated to include 
formal vehicles for lateral 
communication and 
participative decision 
making with master 
franchisee 
 Limited coordination processes between 
franchisor and master franchisee 
 Master franchisee working towards own 
goals and not shared goals of franchise 
network 
 Differences between franchisor and master 
franchisee portfolios, operating systems, 
goals and cultures were emphasised 
 
 Coordination processes increased to include shared 
conferences, interlocking directorates, greater 
socialisation and more informal communication 
 Strong networking between individual members of 
franchisor and master franchisee firms 
 Norms of practice develop across franchise network    
 Members proactively sought areas of commonality to 
improve integration 
 Evidence of all working towards the goals of franchise 
network and beyond extent of original contract 
Commun-
ication 
 Frequent and face-to-face 
communication deemed 
essential by franchisor and 
master franchisee, but was 
limited to senior 
organisational members 
involved in negotiating 
contractual agreement 
 Becomes more formal as a result of control 
and decision-making processes 
 Becomes less frequent between franchisor 
and master franchisee 
 Takes place predominantly at senior 
organisation levels 
 
 Frequent, informal and through different hierarchical 
layers  
 Personal and voice communication essential to reinforce 
individual relationships  
 Members willing to share confidential information 
outside of contractual requirements 
 At unit level communication remained limited to formal 
networking opportunities 
 
needed ‘a big brother’ to gain access to global distribution channels.  As one informant from 
the latter explained, 
 
‘we realised very fast that the [proprietal] brand name which is very strong in 
 [the home market] was very weak outside of [the home market].  We needed to 
 have a different brand in order to grow market share.’  
 
However, both firms had previous inter-organisational experiences, not all of which were 
deemed successful.  Maintaining control was therefore important to both parties as they 
realised that ‘who your cousins are is as important as having cousins’. As a franchisee 
informant explained, 
 
‘We wanted to be in the driver’s seat and actually control the thing…..and in  
the back of the head was only one thing that we wanted, to keep our own 
independence’. 
 
Given their previous experiences, both firms were also clear about what contribution they 
brought to the agreement and the risks they were taking by signing the franchise contract.   
The mutual recognition of this by both firms was therefore critical in the negotiation 
process.  Whether the risk was deemed acceptable however, was reported to be down to 
the ‘personal chemistry’ between the individuals involved in the negotiation process and 
it was this that kept communication channels open between the respective members.  
Similarities in organisational goals, values and cultures between the franchisor and 
franchisee firms were assessed through communication at this stage.  
 
The mutuality of the relationship was also reflected in how the inter-organisational agreement 
was defined.  Despite the fact that the contractual agreement was technically a master 
franchise, corporate press releases and internal documentation referred to it either as an 
‘alliance’ or ‘partnership’.  This definition suggests a balance of power in the relationship and 
this in turn, encouraged the decentralised inter-organisational processes identified in Table 2.   
While the contract stipulated adherence to brand standards as a quality control process, the 
franchisees were not subject to detailed operating and brand manuals that dictated formalised 
policies and procedures.  As one franchisee informant summarised,  
 
‘we could basically develop our business the way we thought it should be done 
without any interference or any big hurdles to jump in the relationship 
….we retained total operational control of our product….nobody would be 
 throwing any manuals at us’. 
 
Inter-firm processes for financial control were really rather limited at this stage as the 
franchisee maintained complete control over their capital and operating budgets.  However, 
the contracts did dictate the fee structure and the franchisor set annual revenue targets for the 
franchisee. Decision-making processes were also decentralised and a number of formal inter-
organisational vehicles, such as a Global Brand Council for marketing and human resource 
decisions, were created to facilitate this process.  The limited degree of formalisation also 
supported this decentralised approach reflecting the control that the franchisee maintained 
over its portfolio.  Once these decisions on operational control were agreed, the contractual 
agreement was signed.  According to informants, the implementation of the agreement was 
the starting point for the second stage where changes to the agreed inter-organisational 
processes took place.  
Stage two: development 
The development phase began with the implementation of the master franchise agreement.  
Informants referred to this stage as the ‘honeymoon period’ that was ‘painfully slow’ and 
‘hugely lacking in trust’.  Within the case, a number of problems materialised due to the more 
tangible differences between the hotel portfolios of the franchisor and master franchisee and 
their administrative and technological systems.  These differences were reported to create a 
number of ‘territorial issues, cultural issues, technology issues and priority issues’ as more 
members of both firms began to work together. The way in which the franchisor tried to deal 
with these issues however, only served to exacerbate them.  The franchisor reportedly began 
to use the contract to govern the agreement, despite the decentralised arrangements agreed 
upon in the formation stage.  The contract clearly depicted that the balance of the power lay 
with the franchisor that began to use its contractual authority to increase the degree of 
centralised control, hierarchical decision-making and the degrees of formalisation as 
illustrated in Table 2.  Informants suggested that the franchisor, 
 
 ‘had a sense of “we must control the brand everywhere in what they do” 
…. if you own a brand you really want to have as much control centrally 
 as possible to ensure that there is consistency.’  
 
There were also financial issues that arose at this stage.  The contracts clearly indicated the 
master franchisee’s contribution to revenue targets as measured through the franchisor’s 
electronic distribution channels.  However, the changes to inter-organisational processes led 
to the franchisee monitoring the performance of the franchisor to determine whether their 
fees were justified through the number of reservations derived through these distribution 
channels.  This way of thinking served to further emphasise the differences between the firms 
and it was suggested that ‘we were still thinking me, you, us, prove your incrementality!’ The 
situation led each firm to focus upon its own organisation goals, rather than those of the 
franchise system.  As one informant reported, 
 
‘.. having joined the club, you behave very badly.  …which is; [you] don’t  
really want to play by the rules of the club.’  
 
Decision making processes also changed at this stage. For example, within the Global Brand 
Council, originally designed for participative decision making, one informant explained that 
when it came to sorting out the issues, ‘nobody was under any illusions, it was led by [the 
franchisor]’ who adopted a centralised approach to decision making. This led to the latter 
dictating through its ultimate contractual authority what should be done according to the 
home-country practices.   
 
Communication became predominantly one-way and top-down.  However, in the face of the 
escalating issues and ‘tensions’, that went on for ‘a year, 18 months’ between the firms, the 
franchisor recognised the need to ‘step up communication’ practices which became more, 
‘frequent, informal, verbal and frequently face-to-face’ especially between the senior 
management of the different firms. Better understanding of the differences between the firms 
and their markets developed and the franchisor began to fully recognise that they needed to 
draw on the strong local market knowledge of the franchisee in order to achieve the goals set 
for the development of the brand.  A senior franchisor member reported, 
 
 ‘it wasn’t necessarily a re-negotiation, it was a realisation’ [of the 
 differences] and the need to ‘do business differently.’   
 
Face-to-face communication, in particular, was reported to have shifted the perceptions of 
managers from one of ‘recognising the differences’ that were a root cause of the inter-firm 
issues, to one of ‘accepting the differences’ and learning to work around them. This required 
franchisor members to, ‘listen with the intent to understand, not with the intent to reply’.  
 
Once the franchisor realised the ‘need to do business differently’, the agreement moved into 
the third stage. Informants reported that the franchisor realised that using the contract to 
manage the relationship was not the best approach.  With hindsight, one informant reflected 
that, 
 
‘The implication is the second you define your relationship as the terms in 
your contract, you have a real problem. You know you have to have a legal 
document that defines how the relationship works and why, but that almost 
needs to be put in the desk drawer…….If you start pulling out the documents 
and pulling out specific things, sub paragraphs, you know you are in for a bit 
of a battle.’  
 
Stage three:  maturity 
The third stage, described by informants as one of ‘maturity’ began when the different firms 
worked collectively for the good of the brand.  Prior to this stage, the relationship between 
the firms had not, 
 
 ‘quite gelled’ [and that] ‘the heart of the problem was we were still  
thinking in terms of “me” and “you” and not “us”.   
 
With this realisation, further changes were made to the inter-organisational processes as 
identified in Table 2, which once again began to reflect the mutuality in the inter-firm 
agreement. However, the franchisor still maintained some centralised control over the brand 
and there were ‘certain core elements that [were] sacred’, particularly within marketing.  
Nonetheless, the franchisee was given greater freedom to run marketing programmes and 
introduce concepts that were not available in the franchisor’s home country.   In addition, 
brand standards were replaced with wider brand values, which enabled greater degrees of 
local variation that reflected market and portfolio differences.  The responsibility for 
monitoring adherence to these values was also devolved to the master franchisee. 
There was also greater use of inter-organisational coordination processes at this stage. Annual 
conferences were reported to have changed from being ‘a bit of a jaunt’ to an opportunity to 
‘share success and best practice’. There was also greater movement of staff members between 
organisations and an interlocking directorate was created.  These changes also led to greater 
franchisee involvement in decision-making as the franchisor, ‘stopped hitting us over the 
head with a baseball bat’.  Another informant explained, 
‘now when it comes to development, it is joint development. It’s no  
longer they go and redevelop and present to the world, they would rather 
 get us involved and we co-develop’. 
This approach was reported to incorporate ‘the grass root experience from multiple markets’ 
and lead to an approach where the franchisor questioned, ‘what is best for the brand and what 
is best for the partners?’ 
Communication between the firms devolved down to lower organisational levels at this stage.  
Formal communication vehicles were superseded to some extent by more informal 
communication practices used to manage the inter-organisational relationship.  For instance, 
the Global Brand Council was reported to have ‘literally petered out’, and become an 
‘anachronism’  ‘because we get things sorted out by a phone call’ and through ‘face-to-face’ 
meetings’.  An informant explained that ‘our relationships are such that we have this ongoing 
dialogue anyway’.  This dialogue led to the emergence of acceptable practices between the 
firms. For example, if there was an issue or query concerning new policies or initiatives, it 
was deemed poor practice to go to a counterpart’s senior manager instead of the counterpart.   
This practice was considered a ‘relationship status thing’.  One informant suggested that as a 
result of these new processes,  
‘we have a healthy debate about how things are done and a very good exchange 
 of information.’  
When these changes in inter-organisational design processes were implemented,  
‘a watershed was reached’ and ‘we were seriously able to stop the engagement  
and get married, really get married’.  
 
Informants reported becoming more ‘customer focused’, rather than ‘proprietal’ and to work 
proactively beyond the terms of the initial contractual agreements.  For example there was a 
greater willingness to share financial and other performance data beyond contractual 
requirements.  As one informant identified,  
 
‘you no longer think about “us and them”,  rather you  think about the most  
cost-effective and customer friendly way of distributing our product’.    
Another informant suggested that this required members to move beyond ‘accepting the 
differences’ between the different firms, to ‘valuing the differences’ and the strengths it 
brought to the brand. The reason for this change was, ‘because it is a strong relationship and 
we trust them and vice versa’.  
However, informants also recognised that this new approach could potentially ‘open up 
anarchy and chaos’ and a mature relationship was necessary to make this workable. 
Informants indicated that there had to be,  
‘trust in the relationship [ and that] it is about having the integrity to 
 know there is no hidden agenda’. 
 
The next section applies the findings of this study to the extant alliance and franchise 
literature to examine the use of operational and relational control through the evolution of 
master franchise agreements. 
 
The evolution of control in master franchise agreements 
 
The findings presented above clearly identify the evolutionary nature of international master 
franchise agreements, supporting Connell’s (1999) findings and previous empirical studies on 
inter-firm alliances (Kanter, 1994; Batonda and Perry, 2003; Poulymenakou and 
Prasopoulou, 2004).  Consistent with these previous works, the study reveals that evolution is 
driven by the need to develop better or more workable inter-organisational designs. However, 
by examining control concurrently from operational, relational and evolutionary perspectives, 
this research builds on the previous body of knowledge by identifying the specific inter-
organisational processes for quality and financial control, decision-making, co-ordination, 
and communication and how these change over time in master franchise agreements.  It 
reveals that these inter-organisational processes are decentralised in the formation stage, 
centralised in the development stage and decentralised once more when a stage of maturity is 
reached. These three stages are discussed, in turn, below.   
 
Alliance researchers have previously identified the importance of social or relational controls 
in the partner selection process (Das and Teng, 1998; Dekker, 2004). This study identifies 
that these controls are also important in master franchise agreements in the formation stage.  
The importance of communication in the maintenance of franchisor-franchisee relationships 
has also been identified (Perry et al, 2002; Doherty and Alexander, 2006; Connell, 1997) and 
that interpersonal interaction facilitates the creation of social relationships (Doherty and 
Alexander, 2004).  Whilst supporting these previous works, this study also identifies the 
impact these relationships have on the development of control systems and on operational 
controls used in master franchise agreements.  The interactions and communication that takes 
place between senior members of franchisor and franchisee organisations help to shape 
perceptions of similarities between firms.  These perceptions, in turn, serve to establish a 
sense of unity between the franchisor and franchisee.  As such, the relevance of relational 
quality to the development of franchisor-franchisee agreements is clearly identified.  
Relational quality is reflected by what Hopkinson and Hogarth-Scott (1999) refer to as a 
balance of power between the franchisor and franchisee and hence the mutuality in the inter-
firm agreement, previously identified in alliance research (Buono, 1997) and conceptualised 
in the franchise literature (Monroy and Alzola, 2005).  In the case study, relational quality 
influenced the adoption of decentralised operational control processes without the reliance on 
standardised operating and training manuals. This study therefore supports previous 
arguments for the need for both relational and operational control processes in alliance 
agreements (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2004).  However, it adds to our current 
understanding of master franchising by identifying that perceived mutuality is a factor that 
influences cooperation and relational controls used in international franchising, a gap 
identified in Table 1.  
 
In the development stage, this mutuality is undermined when there are difficulties 
encountered in implementing the agreement. Alliance researchers have previously identified 
the potential for inter-firm conflict in the development of alliance agreements (see, for 
example, Kanter, 1994). However, this study builds on this research by identifying the impact 
of operational control systems on relational quality at this stage.  In the case study, more 
extensive and centralised operational control processes are introduced by the franchisor 
through the power in the contract.  These findings differ from those of Connell (1997) and 
Quinn (1997) who found that franchisors only use the contract as a control tool when there 
are serious breaches of agreement or when the franchisor wishes to establish structural 
changes.  This research suggests that perceptions of differences between franchisor and 
master franchisees can also influence decisions to use contractual control in international 
franchise agreements. 
 
Differences were noted in portfolios, administrative and technical systems and contractual 
power was used coercively to centralise operational controls and the decision- making 
processes and monitoring systems.  These served to create resentment amongst franchisee 
members and encourage opportunistic behaviour.  Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) have 
argued that control processes that incorporate excessive legal structuring and hierarchical 
monitoring of the relationship can be detrimental to alliance relationships and this study 
suggests that this argument also applies to master franchise agreements.  The operational 
control processes introduced reflect a lack of flexibility on the part of the franchisor and led 
to a lack of cooperation or sense of unity amongst franchise members.  As a result, the 
relational quality (Arino et al, 1997) built in the formation stage deteriorated.  However, 
through enhanced communication and information sharing between the senior members of 
both firms during a transition period, a greater understanding was developed and members of 
both organisations started to accept the differences between the two organisations.  With this 
acceptance, relational quality began to recover, and the relational norm of mutuality was 
reinstated.  The franchisor also demonstrated the willingness to be more flexible in the 
operational control processes used. This study therefore adds to our understanding of 
relational quality in master franchising by identifying that it is the perceptions of franchise 
members, not the actual differences between firms, which influence cooperation, further 
closing this gap identified in Table 1. 
 
As relational quality improved, operational control processes became decentralised again by 
the final stage of maturity.  As these processes were adapted, relational ties increased 
between franchise members, who started to value the differences between the two 
organisations and the strength that it brought to the franchise system.  In addition to the 
relational norms of mutuality and flexibility, there was a greater spirit of cooperation amongst 
these members and a greater sense of unity.  Previous alliance and franchise research 
identifies the role of trust in the development of relational quality (Arino et al, 1997; Doherty 
and Alexander, 2006) and cooperative behaviour in franchise relationships (Doherty and 
Alexander, 2004).   The study provides empirical support for these findings as it identifies 
that trust leads to the emergence of shared norms of behaviour, that serve to enhance 
relational control in master franchise agreements.  At the maturity stage, many of the formal 
operational control processes were deemed unnecessary as members of both firms expected 
that the other would act in the best interest of the agreement and not behave opportunistically.  
Previous alliance researchers have also argued that the need for formalised and hierarchic 
control processes diminishes over time in alliance agreements (Foss et al, 2000; Arino et al, 
2001; Dekker, 2004) as self-enforcing safeguards emerge (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Barringer 
and Harrison, 2000) and this study supports this contention within master franchising.  
However, as there are still some operational controls used at this stage, this study suggests 
trust acts as a complement to, rather than substitutes for, formal operational control as it 
emerges in franchise agreements, as argued by some alliance researchers (Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1994; Das and Teng, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Dekker, 2004). 
 
The case study highlights the importance of relationship management within master 
franchising, as did Doherty and Alexander (2004); Clarkin and Swavely (2006), Doherty and 
Alexander (2006) and Weaven and Frazer (2007a).  Furthermore, it provides evidence to 
support Monroy and Alzola’s (2005) conceptual argument that relational norms and controls 
are developed over time in master franchise systems. However, given the findings from the 
development stage, this is not necessarily a continual process.   The study also offers 
evidence of the role of trust and balanced power in the development of relational quality in 
franchising, a finding consistent with empirical alliance studies (Arino et al, 2001; Parise and 
Casher, 2003; Kauser and Shaw, 2004).  Additionally, it supports the findings of Perry et al 
(2002) who found that trust enhances commitment to the agreement. However, this study 
adds to our understanding of how these norms are developed through the identification of the 
perceptions of franchisor and franchisee members and how these influences the relational 
norms developed and the type of control used.   Four clear and distinct perceptions were 
identified based on similarities and differences in the two firms.   
 
In the formation stage, the negotiations were brought to a close based on members’ mindsets 
that reflected ‘perceptions of similarity’ between the franchisor and franchisee organisational 
goals, values and cultures.  In the development stage, relationships waned when the 
members’ focussed on the differences between the franchisor and franchisee organisations. 
The relationship hit a roadblock at this stage that was characterised by a mindset of ‘us and 
them’. It began to recover when members learned to work through these differences and more 
specifically, learned to accept them.  Franchise members perceptions were thus characterised 
as a mindset of ‘us and them is okay. This, in turn, led members to develop more ties between 
the firms and to value the differences between the two firms.  As the relationship progressed 
to the benefit of both franchisor and franchisee a mindset of ‘us’ developed.   These 
perceptions serve to influence the relational norms developed and these in turn, influence the 
specific operational and relational inter-organisational processes used to control master 
franchise agreements and their evolution throughout the life of the agreement.  Table 3 
depicts how these evolve throughout the three stages identified in this study. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study sought to address a gap in our knowledge of control in international franchising, 
and master franchise agreements in particular. By drawing together previous research on 
alliance and franchise agreements and by examining control concurrently from operational, 
relational and evolutionary perspectives, it makes a contribution to the literature by 
identifying the inter-related nature of operational and relational controls and how these 
evolve throughout the life of master franchise agreements.  It provides empirical evidence of 
the use of both operational and relational controls throughout the life of master franchise 
agreements, and the specific processes and mechanisms used to achieve these types of control 
thereby narrowing a gap identified in the international franchising literature. The study also 
identifies a greater reliance on relational controls in both formation and maturity stages.  
However, as some operational controls are used as well, it provides empirical evidence that 
relational controls act as a compliment to, rather than a complete substitute for, operational 
controls in master franchise agreements.  As such it contributes to the current debate in the 
alliance literature, and to our understanding of how relational controls impact on operational 
controls in international franchising.  Within master franchise agreements, the study suggests 
that relational controls can serve to overcome implications of reduced administrative 
operational controls through devolved quality control processes. In addition, given the 
reliance on relational controls in both formation and maturity stages, there is also empirical 
evidence that relational control can be effective in master franchise agreements. 
 
The study further identifies that trust between franchisor and franchisee members is 
a key ingredient in the development of relational quality and franchisor and 
franchisee willingness to use relational controls.  However, trust and relational 
control can be undermined through the use of hierarchical operational controls, 
providing further evidence of how operational and relational controls impact on each 
other.  The study reveals how operational controls can in fact, encourage, rather 
than inhibit opportunistic behaviour by franchisees.  Furthermore, it identifies the 
importance of franchisor and franchisee members’ perceptions of the similarities and 
differences in franchisor and franchisee organisations to the development of  
 
Table 3: The Evolution of Control in Master Franchise Agreements 
Stage of 
Evolution 
Members 
Mindsets 
Relational Ties/ Relational 
Norms 
Type of 
Control  
Mechanisms Employed 
Formation Characterised 
by  
‘perception 
of 
similarities’ 
 Positive but limited relational 
ties  
 Norm of mutuality 
Operational 
& 
Relational  
 
 
 Decentralised quality control processes 
 Financial targets set & monitored centrally 
 Participative decision making 
 Multi-directional communication 
Development Characterised 
as ‘us and 
them’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characterised 
as ‘us and 
them is okay’ 
 Relational ties tested 
 Relational norms inhibited  
 
 
 
 
 
[Transition….] 
 
 
 Relational recovery as 
relational ties resumed  
 Norms of mutuality and 
flexibility 
Contractual 
& 
Operational 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operational 
&  
Relational 
 Centralised quality and financial control 
processes 
 Centralised decision making 
 Management by contract (power) 
 Formal and less frequent communication 
 
[Transition….] 
 
 Communication increased 
 Control and decision making processes start 
to be adapted 
Maturity Characterised 
as ‘us’ 
 Relational ties increased and 
strengthened 
 Relational norms of 
mutuality, flexibility, 
cooperation and trust 
Relational 
&  
Operational 
 Decentralised financial and quality control  
 Participative decision making 
 Multi-directional communication through 
different organisational levels 
 Shared norms and culture 
 
relational quality and the use of relational controls.  The study therefore adds to our current 
understanding of the factors that influence cooperation in franchise relationships, another gap 
identified in the international franchise literature. 
 
The findings from this study have important implications for members of master franchise 
systems.  When designing control systems, international master franchisors should consider 
how relational and operational control processes can be used from the outset of the 
relationship and how any operational and relational controls implemented might negatively 
impact on each other.  They should also reflect on the degree to which perceptions of 
similarities and differences in franchisor and franchisee organisations and markets influence 
the specific control processes adopted.  Both franchisors and master franchisees should also 
try to understand the factors that influence perceptions of similarities and differences to 
ensure a move to accepting organisational disparities as quickly as possible before relational 
quality is destroyed. Keeping communication channels open is important to ensuring that 
organisational members move to value any benefits that organisational differences can bring 
to the franchise system.  In this way, communication can also serve to enhance relational 
norms and the relational quality developed.  Whilst it may be tempting to use contractual 
controls when inter-firm differences are encountered, these may encourage, rather than 
prevent opportunistic behaviour and undermine relational norms developed.  Franchisors, in 
particular, are advised to consider the use of relational controls if and when franchise 
members perceptions are focused on the differences between firms.   
 
Despite the contributions of this study, further research which investigates factors underlying 
franchise member perceptions and the impact these have on relational quality is very much 
warranted.  Previous research that examines relationship quality within the marketing 
literature (see for example Athanasooulou, 2009) may be beneficial in informing any further 
investigation.  In addition, research into the effectiveness of economic controls in master 
franchise agreements and the extent to which they support other operational and relational 
controls would also be valuable. As a single case study in the hotel industry, there are limits 
to the generalisability of the findings to other master franchise agreements which may have 
their own relational dynamics. Therefore, further empirical research, also taking a dyadic and 
longitudinal perspective, but drawing on a more extensive sample (perhaps comparing the 
experience of different master franchisees in the same franchise system) and within different 
industry sectors, would help to validate the findings from this study. 
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